The Great Game

I've noticed over the past week that there's been a lot of dismay in the blogosphere over the Americans holding bilateral talks with the Iranians. It rankles me as well (personally, I think cruise missiles would get the mullahs' attention quicker), but I'm not surprised.

Cynicism? Not quite. When I was at university, I was fortunate enough to have a diplomatic history professor who was a high Mandarin in the US State Department (Henry Kissinger substituted for him one day when he caught a cold) and he taught me one thing that keeps me from tearing my hair out whenever I read the papers: Never, ever, be surprised by anything that happens in diplomacy, because there's a lot more going on behind the scenes than you'll ever know.

One example he had was the Cuban missile crisis and how it relates to Nixon's visit to China. The orthodox view is that the standoff over Soviet IRBMs in Cuba was an episode of a deadly stare-down finally resolved with the Soviets pulling their missiles out and the Americans doing a face-saving quid pro quo with their missiles in Turkey. What has this got to do with China? And why was Nixon's visit such a sensation in diplomatic circles? Everything.

It turns out that the deal that Kennedy struck with Kruschev was a bit more devious than the public was aware of at the time. What Kennedy actually gave the Soviets in return for disarming Cuba was a promise to allow the USSR a free hand should they go to war with China. Attack Peking, and the USA will sit this one out.

That's where Nixon comes in. His visit to China was more than just the raising of the bamboo curtain that isolated the People's Republic from the rest of the world; it was an open declaration to Moscow that the Kennedy deal was off.

So are the talks with Iran a spineless volte face by the Americans with an implacable enemy who would be better served with blockade? Maybe. But before I decide, I want to look at the rest of the men on the chess board.